Garfield, JL and Thakchoe, S, Identifying the Object of Negation and the Status of Conventional Truth: Why the dGag Bya Matters So Much to Tibetan Madhyamikas, Moonshadows: conventional truth in Buddhist philosophy, Oxford University Press, The Cowherds (ed), New York, pp. 73-87. ISBN 978-0-19-975143-3 (2011) [Research Book Chapter]
Copyright 2011 Oxford University Press
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Emptiness is the emptiness of intrinsic existence. It is, according to all of Nāgārjuna's canonical commentators in India and in Tibet, a negation and, more specifically, an external negation. To say that the statement,
(1) This person is empty of this intrinsic nature.
is a negation is to say that it is logically equivalent to
(2) This person does not have this intrinsic nature.
But that statement in turn is ambiguous. We could read the negation internally and paraphrase as follows:
(3) This person's intrinsic nature is not this.
Or we could read it externally and paraphrase thus:
(4) It is not the case that a person has this intrinsic nature.
No matter how much they affirm or deny the reality of that which is conventional, Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Candrakīrti (as well as both Tsongkhapa and Gorampa, whose dispute regarding the import of this point will occupy most of this chapter) agree that (4) is the correct paraphrase of (1).
|Item Type:||Research Book Chapter|
|Research Division:||Philosophy and Religious Studies|
|Research Field:||Philosophy of religion|
|Objective Division:||Expanding Knowledge|
|Objective Group:||Expanding knowledge|
|Objective Field:||Expanding knowledge in philosophy and religious studies|
|UTAS Author:||Thakchoe, S (Dr Sonam Thakchoe)|
|Downloads:||4 View Download Statistics|
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