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Two concepts of epistemic injustice


Coady, D, Two concepts of epistemic injustice, Episteme, 7, (2) pp. 101-113. ISSN 1742-3600 (2010) [Refereed Article]

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Copyright 2010 Edinburgh University Press

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DOI: doi:10.3366/epi.2010.0001


I describe two concepts of epistemic injustice. The first of these concepts is explained through a critique of Alvin Goldman's veritistic social epistemology. The second is closely based on Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is a tension between these two forms of epistemic injustice and tentatively suggest some ways of resolving the tension. © 2010, Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Research Division:Philosophy and Religious Studies
Research Group:Philosophy
Research Field:Epistemology
Objective Division:Expanding Knowledge
Objective Group:Expanding knowledge
Objective Field:Expanding knowledge in philosophy and religious studies
UTAS Author:Coady, D (Dr David Coady)
ID Code:64344
Year Published:2010
Web of Science® Times Cited:31
Deposited By:Philosophy
Deposited On:2010-07-21
Last Modified:2016-08-31

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