Tikkun Olam through Forgiveness and Promise: Renewing the World in the Thought of Hannah Arendt

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Abstract
This chapter is an exploration of the inseparable faculties of forgiveness and promise in the thought of Hannah Arendt. It focuses on the ways she demythologised certain religious practices and concepts in her political account of forgiveness and promise. Attention is drawn to her recommendation to engage in 'the secularisation of religious tradition,' and the similarities between elements of the Jewish mystical tradition, in particular the concept of *tikkun olam,* and her political theory are made explicit. This study reveals that there is much more at work and at stake in forgiveness and promise than just release from the past and shared commitment to the future.

Key Words: Forgiveness, Hannah Arendt, *tikkun olam,* secularisation, religion.

1. Demythologising Arendt's Method
In 1924-1925 Hannah Arendt encountered a professor in Marburg whose intellectual influence runs like a subterranean river throughout all her writings. I refer to Rudolph Bultmann, whose seminar on the New Testament she attended. A Christian theologian and New Testament scholar, Bultmann was to become famous for his method of demythologisation, which he focused on the *kerygma* of Christ, or the central proclamation of the Gospels. Briefly, his concern was that the meaning of Jesus' life and teachings was, for 20th century Christians, rather obscured by the 1st century world view in which Jesus' words and actions made revelatory sense. More concretely, in Jesus' time signs and portents, prophets and demons were commonplace. While we recognize those terms, we do not share the cultural worldview of the 1st century CE and thus find it difficult to comprehend the meaning of Jesus' message, threaded as it is throughout the demonic warp and prophetic weft of a specific cultural fabric. Bultmann endeavored to demythologise, that is, to re-tell the *kerygma* in a manner that would be meaningful to people living within a very different world view, a different cultural fabric. Put crudely, he extracted from the stories of the New Testament elements that he found to be most meaningful to lived experience in the present. It is Bultmann's method I stress, because I want to suggest that, having encountered the method of demythologisation, Arendt proceeded to apply it throughout her work. She did so in her own idiosyncratic fashion, but her concern with salvaging 'rich and strange' fragments from the past and then re-telling them, with providing new narratives through which to reveal the/a meaning of events and concepts that seemed.
otherwise incomprehensible or unintelligible - this is a fundamentally Bultmannian approach. Margaret Canovan succinctly sums up the 'confusion for Arendt's readers' when they encounter what appears to be a 'kind of deliberately arbitrary use of fragments recovered from the past' combined with 'the phenomenological ambition to recover raw experience.' What I would point out is that Arendt witnessed this method in action in Bultmann's seminar; if we keep in mind Bultmann's influence, her method becomes much less confusing.

Likewise, Arendt's methodological insistence on 'understanding and judging everything in terms of its position in the world at any given time' is grounded upon the presupposition that there can never be 'a definite world view which, once adopted, is immune to further experiences in the world.' This assertion reverberates with Bultmann's insight that 'no world-view of yesterday or today or tomorrow is definitive.' Based on the insight that 'meaning' and 'world view' are intrinsically related and inexorably subject to change, it follows that 'meaning' is in need from time to time of new expression. I suggest this insight also helps to illuminate Arendt's awareness that newcomers to the world need to be re-told the central concerns of the world in a way that meaningfully relates their lives to it. This is how we are able, in her words, 'to prepare them in advance for the task of renewing a common world.' That it is possible to renew the world Arendt seemed never to doubt, but she was clear that it is an ongoing task. One of the problems is that 'the world, in gross and in detail, is irrevocably delivered up to the ruin of time unless human beings are determined to intervene, to alter, to create what is new.' In other words, the world's continuing existence requires constant human intervention and ongoing co-creation.

2. The Concept of Tikkan Olam

Tikkun Olam, a Hebrew phrase that means literally 'repair world,' is translated variously as to repair the world, to restore the world, or to mend the world. The phrase first appeared in the Mishnah, a 3rd century compilation of rabbinic teachings. There it concerned what we would call social policy, specifically social policy focused on assisting the most disempowered within the community: widows, orphans, the poor. As I understand it, tikkan olam in this sense combines acts of loving-kindness with justice. It is about mending ruptures and enabling lives to go on. Importantly, there is both an individual and a communal aspect to tikkan. Tikkan Olam acknowledges that the world's cracks and fissures are materialised first and foremost in specific individuals' lives. Further, as individuals, it does often happen that we assist those whom we know and love. We feel pained by their pain, and do earnestly want to alleviate their suffering and help to mend their lives. But again, the breakage, the ruptures in need of mending are simultaneously personal and worldly. Or, both because we know and love the widow Miriam (if we do) and especially because we do not want any widow to be cast out of the world in common we engage in tikkan olam.
Therefore at the communal level affect recedes and justice comes to the fore. It is simply not possible for everyone to know and love Miriam, but it is possible for a community to decide to look after its widows. Tellingly, and in keeping with a rabbinic stress on communal obligation, in *On Humanity in Dark Times* Arendt railed against the political danger of favouring individual affect or emotion over communal justice. She asked, 'should human beings be so shabby that they are incapable of acting humanly unless spurred and as it were compelled by their own pain when they see others suffer?' Elsewhere she claimed 'that Justice is the quintessence of [human beings'] social condition,' which confirms her abiding concern that relations among humans in the plural do matter greatly. In addition, from the communal perspective we repair and renew the world’s cracks and fissures because it is a just and right way to honour our obligations to those who repaired the world before we arrived and it is our responsibility to pass on to those who will come after us a world in which their individual lives will be perceived to be meaningful. The following quote from Arendt conveys both the political imperative to engage in *tikkun olam* and the sense of inter-generational obligation that accompanies *tikkun*.

Whoever takes upon [themselves] political responsibility will always come to the point where [they] say with Hamlet: ‘The time is out of joint: O cursed spite / That ever I was born to set it right!’ To set the time aright means to renew the world, and this we can do because we all arrived at one time or another as newcomers in a world which was there before us and will still be there when we are gone, when we shall have left its burden to our successors.

Again echoing both the individual and communal nature of *tikkun*, but again minimising the role of emotion, Arendt also stressed the unique, ‘unexchangeable’ contribution each individual can make to the world in common, thereby honouring the personal specificity of each and all. Writing of the cost to the world in common whenever an individual is evicted or withdraws from it she bleakly stated, ‘an almost demonstrable loss to the world takes place; what is lost is the specific and usually irreplaceable in-between which should have formed between this individual and [other human beings].’

Edna Brocke perceptively suggests that Arendt adhered to ‘the Jewish principle of multiplicity, the principle of both/and as opposed to the Western principle of either/or.’ I suggest that this tendency of Arendt’s is most visible whenever she was demythologising or re-telling *tikkun olam* for Western secular ears. Which is to say, Arendt never wavered in her conviction that the collective in-between that is the world, that gives all our lives meaning, and which is in need of continual renewal, is nevertheless only ever constituted by specific individuals at any one
time. That she was never soppy about it does not diminish the importance she deemed each individual life to have for the world in common. However, she was equally clear that without the world in common no individual’s life, words or deeds could have their unique meaning. Without a shared world that provides the space in which each can appear in and be recognised by others as unique, human beings are merely Homo sapiens, one animal species among many wherein all that matters is the continuation of the species. Arendt insisted that human beings are different from other animals precisely because of our unnatural world-creating and world-renewing abilities.

Over the centuries, and in keeping with the changing experiences of the Jews, tikkun too changed in meaning, becoming a core element in Jewish mysticism. Within this mystical tradition, according to Arendt’s review of Gershom Scholem’s account, tikkun seemed to function as the principle compelling ‘concern with reality and action.’ Tikun inspired Jews ‘to develop [themselves as] instruments for active participation in the destiny of mankind.’ Quoting Scholem, Arendt affirmed that ‘the doctrine of Tikun (Lurianic Kabbalah) raised every Jew to the rank of active protagonist in the great process of restitution in a manner never heard of before.’ The point is that Arendt’s political concern with action in the world, her insistence on the unique contribution of each individual’s words and deeds to the world (each one an active protagonist within it), and her abiding concern with renewing the world in common, all of these elements in her thought are a demythologising, a re-telling of certain key aspects of both rabbinic and mystical accounts of tikkun olam. To be clear, she did not demythologise all aspects of tikkun; nowhere in her political theory does she suggest, for example, that divine sparks are scattered throughout all of creation. However, she was well aware that tikkun was originally part of a ‘great religious and metaphysical post-biblical tradition,’ and she expressed profound gratitude to ‘the theologians and scholars... for having preserved it at all.’ Nevertheless, she explicitly advocated ‘the secularisation of religious tradition’ for the sake of people to whom it no longer constitutes a holy past or an untouchable heritage. In this regard she took the method of demythologisation in directions Bultmann did not. Then too, she also took a demythologised concept of tikkun in unexpected directions. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in her account of the world-renewing potential of the conjoined faculties of forgiving and of making and keeping promises.

3. Tikkun olam through Forgiveness and Promises

From the viewpoint of the animal laborans, it is like a miracle that it is also a being that knows of and inhabits a world; from the viewpoint of homo faber, it is like a miracle, like the revelation of divinity, that meaning should have a place in this world.
With those words Arendt concluded the first paragraph of her discussion of 'irreversibility and the power to forgive.' This discussion is followed by her account of 'unpredictability and the power of promise,' but straight away she noted that

the two faculties belong together in so far as one of them; forgiving, serves to undo the deeds of the past, whose 'sins' hang like Damocles' sword over every new generation; and the other, binding oneself through promises, serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the future is by definition, islands of security without which not even continuity, let alone durability of any kind, would be possible in relationships between men.

Immediately then there are two inseparable issues being addressed by Arendt in her re-telling of forgiveness and promises: the miracle that meaning has a place in this world and the obstacles that can block worldly temporal coherence - the irreversibility of the past and the unpredictability of the future. Setting aside for the moment the miracle that meaning appears in the world at all, I will briefly summarise the obstacles to worldly temporal coherence and continuity as set out by Arendt.

The irreversibility of time, in the sense she once characterised as 'the everlasting stream of sheer change,' is an issue because it is characteristic of human beings in the world to act, yet our actions always take place within an 'already existing web of human relationships' and inevitably have unintended consequences. The consequences of our actions sometimes harm others, but they cannot be undone. They stream on, unstoppable ripples that can build into tidal waves or become deadly undertows. To complicate matters further, the future as such is a veritable 'ocean of uncertainty.' When we, as individuals, face this ocean we are confronted with an uncharted expanse so vast and unpredictable it is unnavigable; we are in a sense utterly at sea. Human beings are also notoriously unpredictable creatures. Arendt wrote pointedly of 'the basic unreliability of [people] who can never guarantee today who they will be tomorrow.' Confronted by the unpredictability of the future in conjunction with the unpredictability of ourselves, we become paralysed.

The time-mending remedies Arendt provided for these two predicaments are forgiveness and promises. Forgiveness releases us from the consequences of our irreversible actions; it breaks the hold of the past upon us. Promises provide us with 'islands of security' that allow us to step with some confidence into the future. '[B]eing bound to the fulfilment of promises' also enables us 'to keep our identities,' to maintain meaningful, shared continuity in our individual lives. Paul Ricoeur suggested that Arendt's account of forgiveness and promises 'rests on establishing a very ancient symbolism, that of unbinding/binding, then on
paring forgiving and promising under this dialectic, one of which would unbind and the other bind us. While agreeing that the symbolism of binding/unbinding is at work in Arendt's thought, I suggest that it is working not in an 'either/or' fashion, but in a 'both/and' manner.

Consider forgiveness, that powerful human faculty discovered by Jesus of Nazareth. First of all, it does not just release or unbind someone from the consequences of a past action. In Arendt's demythologised account of Jesus' words, forgiveness must be requested, and in the request for forgiveness there is simultaneously an acknowledgment that this particular harmful action did in fact occur in the world. The one who asks for forgiveness binds him or herself to a past in which at least one other was hurt. The reality of that particular past is reconstituted as a shared reality held in common between different human beings. Yes, those present experienced it differently, but the same event is mutually acknowledged as an event that did occur. All are bound to it. Only then, when its reality has been re-established, can that past release its hold. I believe that while forgiveness releases or unbinds the doer from the deed, it is the acknowledgment of the reality of the event that can release the one done unto. In other words, the reconstitution of the reality of the event can serve to bind the wound or mend the rupture, thereby allowing lives to go forward from the past, released from or in Arendt's words, 'unconditioned by,' that event.

Thus forgiveness re-collects and re-members a broken past, but not just any past - a particular event that has specific meanings for different individuals. These meanings 'originate in the very process of living insofar as we try to reconcile ourselves to what we do and what we suffer.' And here, I think, we can glimpse the link in Arendt's thought between the miracle of meaning in the world and forgiveness. Actions, including the act of forgiveness, 'produce meaningful stories as naturally as fabrication produces use objects.' What was an isolated event occurring between specific parties enters, through the stories told about it, into the wider world. There the stories of that particular act of forgiveness take their place as another example of a new beginning unexpectedly, miraculously afforded through forgiveness. As Arendt once wrote, 'forgiving...succeeds in making a new beginning where everything seemed to have come to an end.' Because of this new beginning worldly time is also set aright, enabled to begin again and continue meaningfully onward. Or, the past that forgiveness can bind together, and in so doing free the individuals involved from its grasp, is always both personal and a worldly event in common, its meaningful reality revealed and released through the stories woven out of its different threads. It is in this regard that the logic of forgiveness in Arendt's account resonates so strongly with tikun olam; forgiveness mends personal ruptures and then contributes meaning to the word in common, as well as, cumulatively, enabling the passage of worldly time from past to present.
However, another crucial aspect of Arendt's account of forgiveness is that it is a common everyday occurrence, just as common as trespasses against one another. There is nothing extraordinary about forgiveness, and forgiveness cannot mend extraordinary ruptures or catastrophic events that take place between human beings. How then can meaningful temporal coherence be re-established after a catastrophic event? How can a world in common be reconstituted? While she never specifically addressed this question, I suggest that Arendt's answer would have been, 'through the making and keeping of promises.' In deceptively simple terms, survivors can make promises to each other, commit together to begin again. Arendt explicitly stressed the 'world-building capacity of...[this] human faculty,' and drew out the relationship between promises made in the present and future generations:

Just as promises and agreements deal with the future and provide stability in the ocean of uncertainty, where the unpredictable may break in from all sides, so the constituting, founding, and world-building capacities of [human beings] concern always not so much ourselves and our own time on earth as our ‘successor’, and ‘posterities.’

Here it is possible to hear an echo of the covenant between Abraham and God, in which God promised to remain in a relationship with generation after generation of Abraham's descendants. Or, whereas Paul Ricoeur wrote, 'It did not escape Hannah Arendt's attention that forgiveness has a religious aura that promising does not,' I would argue that the religious aura surrounding promising has escaped almost everyone's attention perhaps because Arendt demythologised promising so effectively.

At the very end of her discussion of promises as providing islands of certainty, instances of predictability to which human beings are bound through shared commitment, she suddenly upended the entire picture and assured her readers of the promise of the entirely new, the entirely unpredictable, of 'the miracle that saves the world.' And what is this miracle that saves the world? According to Arendt it is natality that bestows 'faith' and 'hope' on human affairs. What she seemed to mean by this is that each arrival to the world both is and begins something entirely new, and without this unexpected, unpredictable new that intervenes, that alters, that begins again, the world and worldly time would be bound for ruin. Importantly, I think, natality does not promise any certainty. All it promises is that what will become of the world and worldly time in common cannot be predicted; it is not necessarily bound for ruin. Accordingly, just as forgiveness both binds and unbinds, so too does the promise both bind (through shared commitment) and unbind (through natality). Although conceptually it was a beautifully symmetrical move on her part to ensure that both forgiveness and the
promise bind and unbind all concerned, I do not believe she made it for symmetry’s sake. Rather, time and again Arendt insisted on the ‘startling unexpectedness... inherent in all beginnings.’ The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability, which for all practical, everyday purposes amounts to certainty; the new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle. The fact that [human beings are] capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from [them], that [they are] able to perform what is infinitely improbable. And this again is possible only because each [one] is unique, so that with each birth something entirely new comes into the world.

Through individual instances of forgiveness and promises a meaningful temporal continuity is repeatedly mended, reconstituted. When the wounds of the past are bound it releases its grasp upon us - even as the reality of that past is affirmed as a worldly past in common. When we commit ourselves to a shared future in which all our actions matter we bind our present to a future already imbued with meaning. In Arendt’s re-telling, then, forgiveness and promises are woven together; together they reconstitute temporal coherence in the world of human affairs, and together, miraculously, they produce those new beginnings without which the world would be ‘delivered up to the ruin of time.’ Together, they enact tikkan olam: mending and renewing the world in common.

Notes

1 According to Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, attendance at his seminar was by permission only. When Arendt went for her interview with him she explained to Bultmann ‘there must be no anti-Semitic remarks.’ To this Bultmann apparently replied, ‘we two together will handle the situation.’ (E. Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1982, pp. 61-62). Arendt developed a deep respect for Bultmann, maintaining a friendship with him and keeping up with his work throughout her life. See E. Brocke, ‘Afterward: Big Hannah – My Aunt’, The Jewish Writings, J. Kohn and R. H. Feldman (eds), Schocken Books, New York, 2007, p. 515.

2 See R. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1958, p. 18.

3 Bultmann, p. 35, ‘To de-mythologize is to reject not Scripture or the Christian message as a whole, but the world-view of Scripture, which is the world-view of a past epoch...’
7 Bultmann, p. 37.
9 Ibid., p. 192.
10 It is not an exaggeration to say that world renewal in Arendt's thought is both a political imperative and a non-personal ethical touchstone. Writing affirming of an early play by Bertolt Brecht, she distilled this claim into a single phrase: 'that on the day you must leave the world it will be of greater consequence to leave behind you a better world than to have been good.' (H. Arendt, 'Bertolt Brecht', *Men in Dark Times*, Harcourt Brace & Company, San Diego, New York, London, 1968, p. 236.)
11 Arendt, 'On Humanity in Dark Times', p. 15.
15 Arendt, 'On Humanity in Dark Times', pp. 4-5.
17 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 97. 'Without a world into which men are born and from which they die, there would be nothing but changeless eternal recurrence, the deathless everlastingness of the human as of all other animal species.'
20 Ibid., p. 308.
21 Ibid., p. 308.
23 Ibid., p. 301.
24 Ibid., p. 300.
26 Ibid., p. 236.
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29 Arendt, Life of the Mind/Thinking, p. 205.
31 Ibid., p. 237.
32 Ibid., p. 244.
33 Ibid., p. 237.
34 Ibid., p. 237.
37 Ibid., pp. 239-240.
38 Ibid., p. 241. ‘Forgiving, in other words, is the only reaction which does not merely re-act buts acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven.’
40 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 236.
42 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 240. ‘But trespassing is an everyday occurrence which is in the very nature of action’s constant establishment of new relationships within a web of relations, and it needs forgiving, dismissing, in order to make it possible for life to go on by constantly releasing men from what they have done unknowingly.’
43 Ibid., p. 241.
46 Ibid., pp. 166-167.
47 See also Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 243-244.
48 Ricoeur, History, Memory, Forgetting, p. 487.

Because promising is of such worldly significance, it is crucial to understand how the logic of the promise functions in Arendt’s thought. Briefly, a promise is both a vision and an anticipation of a future in which all our actions will have meaning, a future in which all our actions will matter. In promising, that is, we commit or bind ourselves to a shared world and a shared time in which our promises will become actualised. But the meaning of those future actions is added to the present at the moment the promise is made. A promise, therefore, extends the horizons of our world now; it extends the meaning of our present by binding us to a future in common and thereby creates temporal coherence and continuity in the world.
Bibliography


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