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Fisheries quota allocation: laboratory experiments on simultaneous and combinatorial auctions

Citation

Tisdell, JG and Iftekhar, M, Fisheries quota allocation: laboratory experiments on simultaneous and combinatorial auctions, Marine Policy, 38 pp. 228-234. ISSN 0308-597X (2013) [Refereed Article]

Copyright Statement

Copyright 2012 Elsevier Ltd.

DOI: doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2012.05.039

Abstract

Markets for individual tradeable fishing quota are evolving and maturing in many countries throughout the world. Synergies in spatial and temporal packages of fishing quotas have yet to be explored and exploited. The relative performance of simultaneous multi-round and combinatorial auctions has been well documented and explored in a number of environments including the allocation of spectrum rights by the US Federal Communications Commission, aircraft take-off and landing slots,as well as pollution emissions allowances. It is therefore timely and policy relevant to explore the relative performance of simultaneous and combinatorial fishery quota markets in controlled experimental environments. This paper reports the results of a series of economic experiments exploring the relative merits of these alternative fishing quota markets. The results provide important insights into the future development of individual tradeable fishing quotas.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Keywords:Combinatorial auction; ITQs; Simutaneious auction
Research Division:Economics
Research Group:Applied Economics
Research Field:Experimental Economics
Objective Division:Economic Framework
Objective Group:Other Economic Framework
Objective Field:Economic Framework not elsewhere classified
Author:Tisdell, JG (Professor John Tisdell)
Author:Iftekhar, M (Mr Sayed Iftekhar)
ID Code:85006
Year Published:2013
Web of Science® Times Cited:6
Deposited By:Economics and Finance
Deposited On:2013-06-11
Last Modified:2017-12-08
Downloads:0

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