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Logic or reason?


Rush, P, Logic or reason?, Logic and Logical Philosophy, 21 pp. 127-163. ISSN 1425-3305 (2012) [Refereed Article]

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Copyright Statement

Copyright 2012 Nicolaus Copernicus University, Toruń

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DOI: doi:10.12775/LLP.2012.008


This paper explores the question of what logic is not. It argues against the wide spread assumptions that logic is: a model of reason; a model of correct reason; the laws of thought, or indeed is related to reason at all such that he essential nature of the two are crucially or essentially coillustrative. I note that due to such assumptions, our current understanding of the nature of logic itself is thoroughly entangled with the nature of reason. I show that most arguments for the presence of any sort of essential relationship between logic and reason face intractable problems and demands, and fall well short of addressing them. These arguments include those for the notion that logic is normative for reason (or that logic and correct reason are in some way the same thing), that logic is some sort of description of correct reason and that logic is an abstracted or idealised version of correct reason. A strong version of logical realism is put forward as an alternative view, and is briefly explored.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Research Division:Philosophy and Religious Studies
Research Group:Philosophy
Research Field:Aesthetics
Objective Division:Expanding Knowledge
Objective Group:Expanding knowledge
Objective Field:Expanding knowledge in philosophy and religious studies
UTAS Author:Rush, P (Dr Penelope Rush)
ID Code:84612
Year Published:2012
Deposited By:Philosophy
Deposited On:2013-05-22
Last Modified:2014-10-10

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