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Beyond the blame game: political strategies for state funding reform


Eccleston, RG and Warren, N and Woolley, TG, Beyond the blame game: political strategies for state funding reform, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 72, (1) pp. 14-30. ISSN 1467-8500 (2013) [Refereed Article]

Copyright Statement

Copyright 2013 The Authors

DOI: doi:10.1111/1467-8500.12007


There is growing concern that intergovernmental financial relations in the Australian federation are becoming increasingly acrimonious and dysfunctional. This paper argues that it is necessary to analyse State funding as a whole, including the critical relationship between State-level taxation and its reform and the broader Commonwealth Grants Commission regime, if we are to establish a system of State funding which is financially sustainable, promotes economic efficiency and is broadly congruent with established norms of Australian federalism. Above all, based on international experience, we argue Commonwealth leadership is required to achieve this goal. We conclude with a case study concerning resource taxation which demonstrates how the Commonwealth could provide leadership using a ‘bundled’ approach to policy reform. It is argued that such an approach has the potential to alleviate wider intergovernmental conflicts which currently afflict Australian federalism.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Keywords:fiscal federalism, commonwealth grants commission, mining tax, state taxation, GST
Research Division:Human Society
Research Group:Policy and administration
Research Field:Public administration
Objective Division:Law, Politics and Community Services
Objective Group:Government and politics
Objective Field:Public services policy advice and analysis
UTAS Author:Eccleston, RG (Professor Richard Eccleston)
UTAS Author:Woolley, TG (Mr Timothy Woolley)
ID Code:84317
Year Published:2013
Web of Science® Times Cited:5
Deposited By:School of Social Sciences
Deposited On:2013-05-06
Last Modified:2017-11-27

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