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The effect of bidder heterogeneity on combinatorial conservation auction designs

Citation

Iftekhar, MS and Hailu, A and Lindner, RK, The effect of bidder heterogeneity on combinatorial conservation auction designs, Environmental and Resource Economics, 53, (1) pp. 137-157. ISSN 0924-6460 (2012) [Refereed Article]

Copyright Statement

Copyright 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

DOI: doi:10.1007/s10640-012-9553-7

Abstract

In an iterative combinatorial auction, bidders can submit bids on individual and/or on combinations of projects in a series of intermediate rounds, where bid prices are revised before a final allocation is made. The iterative format is useful for conservation service procurement as landholders can rely on market information revealed through the rounds to evaluate their choices of projects and bid prices. However, there is no single way of providing the market information. Different designs for generating price information have been proposed. Little is known about the performance of iterative combinatorial auction designs when heterogeneous bidders, with different cost structures, participate in an auction. Using an agent based model, we evaluate a selected set of designs under different bidder heterogeneity scenarios. We observe that higher degrees of heterogencity lead to lower auction efficiency and that auction outcomes are highly sentive to price feedback design choices.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Keywords:agent based model, bidder heterogeneity, conservation auction, item price feedbacks, iterative combinatorial auction
Research Division:Economics
Research Group:Applied Economics
Research Field:Environment and Resource Economics
Objective Division:Economic Framework
Objective Group:Other Economic Framework
Objective Field:Ecological Economics
Author:Iftekhar, MS (Mr Sayed Iftekhar)
ID Code:83668
Year Published:2012
Web of Science® Times Cited:5
Deposited By:Economics and Finance
Deposited On:2013-03-20
Last Modified:2016-09-30
Downloads:0

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