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Identifying the Object of Negation and the Status of Conventional Truth: Why the dGag Bya Matters So Much to Tibetan Madhyamikas
Emptiness is the emptiness of intrinsic existence. It is, according to all of Nāgārjuna's canonical commentators in India and in Tibet, a negation and, more specifically, an external negation. To say that the statement,
(1) This person is empty of this intrinsic nature.
is a negation is to say that it is logically equivalent to
(2) This person does not have this intrinsic nature.
But that statement in turn is ambiguous. We could read the negation internally and paraphrase as follows:
(3) This person's intrinsic nature is not this.
Or we could read it externally and paraphrase thus:
(4) It is not the case that a person has this intrinsic nature.
No matter how much they affirm or deny the reality of that which is conventional, Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Candrakīrti (as well as both Tsongkhapa and Gorampa, whose dispute regarding the import of this point will occupy most of this chapter) agree that (4) is the correct paraphrase of (1).
History
Publication title
Moonshadows: conventional truth in Buddhist philosophyEditors
The CowherdsPagination
73-87ISBN
978-0-19-975143-3Department/School
School of HumanitiesPublisher
Oxford University PressPlace of publication
New YorkExtent
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Copyright 2011 Oxford University PressRepository Status
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