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The logic of Quinean revisability


Chase, JK, The logic of Quinean revisability, Synthese, 184, (3) pp. 357-373. ISSN 1573-0964 (2012) [Refereed Article]

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DOI: doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9819-y


W. V. Quine is committed to the claim that all beliefs are rationally revisable; Jerrold Katz has argued that this commitment is unstable on grounds of self-application. The subsequent discussion of this issue has largely proceeded in terms of the logic of belief revision, but there is also an issue here for the treatment of Quine's views in a doxastic modal system. In this paper I explore the treatment of Quinean epistemology in modal terms. I argue that a set of formal revisability desiderata can be distilled from Quine's epistemic writings, and that there are demonstrably coherent and non-trivial systems that meet these conditions. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Research Division:Philosophy and Religious Studies
Research Group:Philosophy
Research Field:Metaphysics
Objective Division:Expanding Knowledge
Objective Group:Expanding knowledge
Objective Field:Expanding knowledge in philosophy and religious studies
UTAS Author:Chase, JK (Associate Professor James Chase)
ID Code:65112
Year Published:2012
Web of Science® Times Cited:4
Deposited By:Philosophy
Deposited On:2010-10-05
Last Modified:2017-04-11
Downloads:1 View Download Statistics

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