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The political-economy of conflicts over wealth: why don't the rabble expropriate the rich?
Citation
Coram, A, The political-economy of conflicts over wealth: why don't the rabble expropriate the rich?, Public Choice, 136, (3-4) pp. 315-330. ISSN 0048-5829 (2008) [Refereed Article]
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Copyright Statement
Copyright 2008 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
DOI: doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9298-6
Abstract
The most striking feature of liberal democracies is the coexistence of large inequalities
of wealth with a roughly egalitarian distribution of voting power. So far most
attempts to explain this have asked ‘why don’t the poor form a coalition to expropriate the
rich?’ This paper argues that this is not necessarily the best way to interpret the problem
and attempts to provide an alternative unified political-economic model that is more consistent
with standard assumptions about voting. This is done by studying what would happen
if every possible coalition could form in a wealth distribution game. Among the main
findings is that, if the marginal contribution of every individual to production is increasing
sufficiently, there is a stable distribution of the product. This may include the egalitarian
distribution. If individuals are not so valuable there is no stable distribution.
Item Details
Item Type: | Refereed Article |
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Keywords: | political-economy, distribution, voting, cooperative game theory, core |
Research Division: | Human Society |
Research Group: | Political science |
Research Field: | Political science not elsewhere classified |
Objective Division: | Economic Framework |
Objective Group: | Macroeconomics |
Objective Field: | Income distribution |
UTAS Author: | Coram, A (Professor Alex Coram) |
ID Code: | 56025 |
Year Published: | 2008 |
Web of Science® Times Cited: | 2 |
Deposited By: | Government |
Deposited On: | 2009-03-22 |
Last Modified: | 2012-11-28 |
Downloads: | 0 |
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