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Indicator Reliabilism
Citation
Chase, JK, Indicator Reliabilism, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69, (1) pp. 115-137. ISSN 0031-8205 (2004) [Refereed Article]
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Copyright Statement
The definitive published version is available online at: http://interscience.wiley.com
Official URL: http://interscience.wiley.com
DOI: doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00386.x
Abstract
In 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology'Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of epistemic access, and use this to present an analysis of justification as an indicator concept we use to track how well the evaluated agent is doing with respect to the primary epistemic norm of believing truths and not falsehoods. A theory of justification along these lines is then given, and its prospects of handling the evil demon objection to reliabilism are assessed.
Item Details
| Item Type: | Refereed Article |
|---|---|
| Research Division: | Philosophy and Religious Studies |
| Research Group: | Philosophy |
| Research Field: | Logic |
| Objective Division: | Expanding Knowledge |
| Objective Group: | Expanding knowledge |
| Objective Field: | Expanding knowledge in philosophy and religious studies |
| UTAS Author: | Chase, JK (Dr James Chase) |
| ID Code: | 54188 |
| Year Published: | 2004 |
| Web of Science® Times Cited: | 4 |
| Deposited By: | Philosophy |
| Deposited On: | 2009-02-12 |
| Last Modified: | 2009-07-06 |
| Downloads: | 0 |
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