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Indicator Reliabilism


Chase, JK, Indicator Reliabilism, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69, (1) pp. 115-137. ISSN 0031-8205 (2004) [Refereed Article]

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DOI: doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00386.x


In 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology'Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of epistemic access, and use this to present an analysis of justification as an indicator concept we use to track how well the evaluated agent is doing with respect to the primary epistemic norm of believing truths and not falsehoods. A theory of justification along these lines is then given, and its prospects of handling the evil demon objection to reliabilism are assessed.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Research Division:Philosophy and Religious Studies
Research Group:Philosophy
Research Field:Logic
Objective Division:Expanding Knowledge
Objective Group:Expanding knowledge
Objective Field:Expanding knowledge in philosophy and religious studies
UTAS Author:Chase, JK (Dr James Chase)
ID Code:54188
Year Published:2004
Web of Science® Times Cited:4
Deposited By:Philosophy
Deposited On:2009-02-12
Last Modified:2009-07-06

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