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Esteem-based contributions and optimality in public goods supply

Citation

Brennan, G and Brooks, MA, Esteem-based contributions and optimality in public goods supply, Public Choice, 130, (3-4) pp. 457-470. ISSN 0048-5829 (2007) [Refereed Article]


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The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com

DOI: doi:10.1007/s11127-006-9098-9

Abstract

In a paper published in this journal, Cowen (2002) argues that whenever compliance with norms is supported by the forces of esteem, there is "too little" norm compliance. In this paper, we show that Cowen’s logic is flawed – that when the operation of esteem-based norms is formally modelled, no such general a priori conclusion follows. We investigate the conditions that would be necessary to ensure that esteem incentives for public goods contributions generate optimality in public goods supply, and indicate on that basis the conditions for voluntary sub-optimal and supra-optimal public goods provision in the esteem context.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Keywords:Esteem - Public goods - Voluntary provision - Optimality and market failure
Research Division:Economics
Research Group:Applied Economics
Research Field:Public Economics- Taxation and Revenue
Objective Division:Economic Framework
Objective Group:Microeconomics
Objective Field:Microeconomics not elsewhere classified
Author:Brooks, MA (Associate Professor Michael Brooks)
ID Code:50670
Year Published:2007
Web of Science® Times Cited:3
Deposited By:Economics and Finance
Deposited On:2007-08-01
Last Modified:2010-05-13
Downloads:1 View Download Statistics

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