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The fragility of robust realism: a reply to Dreyfus and Spinosa


Malpas, J, The fragility of robust realism: a reply to Dreyfus and Spinosa, Inquiry, 42, (1) pp. 89-102. ISSN 0020-174X (1999) [Refereed Article]

DOI: doi:10.1080/002017499321642


Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Spinosa's argument for 'robust' realism centres on the possibility of our having access to things as they are in themselves and so as having access to things in a way that is not dependent on our 'quotidian concerns or sensory capacities'. Dreyfus and Spinosa claim that our everyday access to things is incapable of providing access of this kind, since our everyday access is holistically enmeshed with our everyday attitudes and concerns. The argument that Dreyfus and Spinosa provide in support of this conclusion seems, however, to depend on illegitimately combining what are really two separate issues: that concerning the independence of the things themselves with the independence of our means of access to those things. Contrary to Dreyfus and Spinosa, the fact that our everyday access to things is necessarily dependent on our everyday attitudes and concerns does not mean that we therefore have access to things only as they 'appear' rather than as they are 'in themselves'. © 1999 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Research Division:Philosophy and Religious Studies
Research Group:Philosophy
Research Field:Metaphysics
Objective Division:Education and Training
Objective Group:Other education and training
Objective Field:Other education and training not elsewhere classified
UTAS Author:Malpas, J (Professor Jeff Malpas)
ID Code:35340
Year Published:1999
Web of Science® Times Cited:5
Deposited By:Philosophy
Deposited On:2005-08-01
Last Modified:2011-08-05

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