This paper analyses the economic efficiency of management regimes for the recreational use of a natural resource. Management must determine the use and development of the natural resource. The first-best policy uses price to offset the externalities of crowding and deterioration. This is contrasted with two second-best polices which do not use pricing: unrestricted access and quotas. A condition under which a relaxation of quota level increases efficiency is derived. Under iso-elastic functional forms quotas are less efficient than unrestricted access.

Item Type:	Refereed Article
Research Division:	Economics
Research Group:	Applied Economics
Research Field:	Environment and Resource Economics
Objective Division:	Economic Framework
Objective Group:	Microeconomics
Objective Field:	Microeconomics not elsewhere classified
Author:	Sibly, HA (Dr Hugh Sibly)
ID Code:	22919
Year Published:	2001
Web of Science® Times Cited:	4
Deposited By:	Economics and Finance
Deposited On:	2001-08-01
Last Modified:	2002-05-09
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