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Pain deproblematized
journal contribution
posted on 2023-05-16, 13:06 authored by Garfield, JLIn this paper I demonstrate that the "pain problem" Dartnall claims, to have discovered is in fact no problem at all. Dartnall's construction of the apparent problem, I argue, relies on an erroneous assumption of the unity of consciousness, an erroneous assumption of the simplicity of pain as a phenomenon ignoring crucial neurophysiological and neuroanatomical information, a mistaken account of introspective knowledge according to which introspection gives us inner episodes veridically and in their totality and a model of consciousness that depicts the mind as an attic of inner objects towards which attention might or might not be directed. Once these errors are dispelled, no problem remains. None the less, given the seductiveness of these errors, and the havoc they wreak in cognitive science, dispelling them is a worthwhile exercise.
History
Publication title
Philosophical PsychologyVolume
14Issue
No 1, 2001Pagination
103-107ISSN
0951-5089Department/School
School of HumanitiesPublisher
Taylor & Francis LtdPlace of publication
Abingdon, Oxfordshire, UKRepository Status
- Restricted