In this paper I demonstrate that the "pain problem" Dartnall claims, to have discovered is in fact no problem at all. Dartnall's construction of the apparent problem, I argue, relies on an erroneous assumption of the unity of consciousness, an erroneous assumption of the simplicity of pain as a phenomenon ignoring crucial neurophysiological and neuroanatomical information, a mistaken account of introspective knowledge according to which introspection gives us inner episodes veridically and in their totality and a model of consciousness that depicts the mind as an attic of inner objects towards which attention might or might not be directed. Once these errors are dispelled, no problem remains. None the less, given the seductiveness of these errors, and the havoc they wreak in cognitive science, dispelling them is a worthwhile exercise.

Item Type:	Refereed Article
Research Division:	Philosophy and Religious Studies
Research Group:	Philosophy
Research Field:	Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition)
Objective Division:	Expanding Knowledge
Objective Group:	Expanding Knowledge
Objective Field:	Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies
UTAS Author:	Garfield, JL (Professor Jay Garfield)
ID Code:	22537
Year Published:	2001
Deposited By:	Philosophy
Deposited On:	2001-08-01
Last Modified:	2002-05-08
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