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Fitch's Proof, Verificationism and the Knower Paradox


Beall, J, Fitch's Proof, Verificationism and the Knower Paradox, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78, (No 2) pp. 241-247. ISSN 0004-8402 (2000) [Refereed Article]

DOI: doi:10.1080/00048400012349521


I have argued that without an adequate solution to the knower paradox Fitch's Proof is- or at least ought to be-ineffective against verificationism. Of course, in order to follow my suggestion verificationists must maintain that there is currently no adequate solution to the knower paradox, and that the paradox continues to provide prima facie evidence of inconsistent knowledge. By my lights, any glimpse at the literature on paradoxes offers strong support for the first thesis, and any honest, non-dogmatic reflection on the knower paradox provides strong support for the second. Whether verificationists want to go the route I've suggested is not for me todecide. As in the previous section my aim has been that of defending the mere viability of verificationism in the face of what many, many philosophers have taken to be its death-knell, namely Fitch's Proof. But, as the final objection makes clear, showing that verificationism can live in the face of Fitch's Proof is one thing; showing that it should live is another project. If nothing else, I hope that this papershows that verificationists still have a project to pursue; Fitch's Proof, contrary to popular opinion, need not bury verificationism.13.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Research Division:Philosophy and Religious Studies
Research Group:Philosophy
Research Field:Logic
Objective Division:Expanding Knowledge
Objective Group:Expanding knowledge
Objective Field:Expanding knowledge in philosophy and religious studies
UTAS Author:Beall, J (Professor JC Beall)
ID Code:20296
Year Published:2000
Web of Science® Times Cited:27
Deposited By:Philosophy
Deposited On:2000-08-01
Last Modified:2001-06-18

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