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Contrastive Empiricism and Indispensability
Citation
Colyvan, M, Contrastive Empiricism and Indispensability, Erkenntnis, 51, (2-3) pp. 323-332. ISSN 0165-0106 (1999) [Refereed Article]
DOI: doi:10.1023/A:1005427803093
Abstract
The Quine-Putnam indispensability argument urges us to place mathematical entities on the same ontological footing as (other) theoretical entities of empirical science. Recently this argument has attracted much criticism, and in this paper I address one criticism due to Elliott Sober. Sober argues that mathematical theories cannot share the empirical support accrued by our best scientific theories, since mathematical propositions are not being tested in the same way as the clearly empirical propositions of science. In this paper I defend the Quine-Putnam argument against Sober's objections. © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Item Details
Item Type: | Refereed Article |
---|---|
Research Division: | Philosophy and Religious Studies |
Research Group: | Philosophy |
Research Field: | Epistemology |
Objective Division: | Expanding Knowledge |
Objective Group: | Expanding knowledge |
Objective Field: | Expanding knowledge in philosophy and religious studies |
UTAS Author: | Colyvan, M (Dr Mark Colyvan) |
ID Code: | 16985 |
Year Published: | 1999 |
Deposited By: | Philosophy |
Deposited On: | 1999-08-01 |
Last Modified: | 2011-08-05 |
Downloads: | 0 |
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