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Large stakes and little honesty? Experimental evidence from a developing country

Citation

Leibbrandt, A and Maitra, P and Neelim, A, Large stakes and little honesty? Experimental evidence from a developing country, Economics Letters, 169 pp. 76-79. ISSN 0165-1765 (2018) [Refereed Article]

Copyright Statement

© 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V

DOI: doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.007

Abstract

We experimentally study the extent to which individuals are honest when lying can result in a gain of several months’ worth of income. Randomly selected individuals from villages in Bangladesh participated in a sender–receiver cheap talk game. We varied the potential benefits from providing false recommendations. While we find that individuals are more likely to provide false recommendations when stakes are very large, we still observe that almost half of the senders refrain from lying. In contrast, receivers are generally suspicious and the majority does not follow recommendations.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Keywords:artefactual field experiment, honesty, deception, stakes, development
Research Division:Economics
Research Group:Applied economics
Research Field:Experimental economics
Objective Division:Economic Framework
Objective Group:Microeconomics
Objective Field:Preference, behaviour and welfare
UTAS Author:Neelim, A (Dr Ananta Neelim)
ID Code:146895
Year Published:2018
Web of Science® Times Cited:2
Deposited By:Economics and Finance
Deposited On:2021-10-03
Last Modified:2022-01-17
Downloads:0

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