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Large stakes and little honesty? Experimental evidence from a developing country
Citation
Leibbrandt, A and Maitra, P and Neelim, A, Large stakes and little honesty? Experimental evidence from a developing country, Economics Letters, 169 pp. 76-79. ISSN 0165-1765 (2018) [Refereed Article]
Copyright Statement
© 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V
DOI: doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.007
Abstract
We experimentally study the extent to which individuals are honest when lying can result in a gain of several months’ worth of income. Randomly selected individuals from villages in Bangladesh participated in a sender–receiver cheap talk game. We varied the potential benefits from providing false recommendations. While we find that individuals are more likely to provide false recommendations when stakes are very large, we still observe that almost half of the senders refrain from lying. In contrast, receivers are generally suspicious and the majority does not follow recommendations.
Item Details
| Item Type: | Refereed Article |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | artefactual field experiment, honesty, deception, stakes, development |
| Research Division: | Economics |
| Research Group: | Applied economics |
| Research Field: | Experimental economics |
| Objective Division: | Economic Framework |
| Objective Group: | Microeconomics |
| Objective Field: | Preference, behaviour and welfare |
| UTAS Author: | Neelim, A (Dr Ananta Neelim) |
| ID Code: | 146895 |
| Year Published: | 2018 |
| Web of Science® Times Cited: | 3 |
| Deposited By: | Economics and Finance |
| Deposited On: | 2021-10-03 |
| Last Modified: | 2022-01-17 |
| Downloads: | 0 |
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