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Large stakes and little honesty? Experimental evidence from a developing country

journal contribution
posted on 2023-05-21, 02:53 authored by Leibbrandt, A, Maitra, P, Ananta NeelimAnanta Neelim
We experimentally study the extent to which individuals are honest when lying can result in a gain of several months’ worth of income. Randomly selected individuals from villages in Bangladesh participated in a sender–receiver cheap talk game. We varied the potential benefits from providing false recommendations. While we find that individuals are more likely to provide false recommendations when stakes are very large, we still observe that almost half of the senders refrain from lying. In contrast, receivers are generally suspicious and the majority does not follow recommendations.

History

Publication title

Economics Letters

Volume

169

Pagination

76-79

ISSN

0165-1765

Department/School

TSBE

Publisher

Elsevier Science Sa

Place of publication

Po Box 564, Lausanne, Switzerland, 1001

Rights statement

© 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V

Repository Status

  • Restricted

Socio-economic Objectives

Preference, behaviour and welfare

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