Knowing Illusion: Bringing a Tibetan Debate into Contemporary Discourse. Volume I: A Philosophical History of the Debate

The two volumes of this study examine fundamental issues in Buddhist thought and practice, particularly the implications of the two truths (relative and ultimate). If, as Buddhist sources claim, all perceptions are overlaid with error, is it possible to have confidence in our knowledge of the world? If buddhas only perceive reality as it is, that are they incapable of relating to ordinary beings, who view their environment through a lens of false imaginings? Taktsang Sherap Rinchen, a fifteenth-century Sakya scholar, explored the philosophical and practical ramifications of Madhyamaka antifoundationalism. He accused Tsongkhapa, one of Tibet’s most influential thinkers, of a fundamental incoherence that stems from an attempt to bring together the Epistemology tradition, which posits reliable epistemic instruments, and Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, which rejects any attempt at foundationalism. Both Taktsang and Tsongkhapa claim to interpret Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti correctly but draw vastly different conclusions from their respective readings. The controversy Taktsang sparked has its roots in Indian debates regarding the implications of the two truths. These were further developed in Tibet and engaged some of Tibet’s best minds for centuries. Our study, the first book-length discussion of this debate, situates this literature in a philosophical perspective. We elucidate parallels with debates in contemporary global philosophy, and we demonstrate the implications of the debate for the entire Buddhist enterprise of making sense of the world and presenting a path capable of leading beings to buddhahood.