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Simmelian ties and structural holes: Exploring their topological roles in forming trust for securing wireless sensor networks
conference contribution
posted on 2023-05-23, 14:45 authored by Xiang, M, Liu, W, Quan BaiQuan Bai, Al-Anbuky, ADue to the nature of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in open-access and error-prone wireless environments, the security issues are always crucial. The traditional security mechanisms such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is no longer as feasible in protecting WSN as in wired networks. The new concept of trust has emerged in recent studies as an alternative mechanism to address the security concerns in WSNs. Most recent studies on trust are mainly focused on how to model and evaluate trust so as to effectively detect, isolate, and avoid any malicious activity in the network. In this paper, we have introduced the new angle of adaptive network approach to study 'dynamics on networks' i.e., trust state transition on a network with a fixed topology or 'dynamics of networks' i.e., topological transformation of a network with no dynamic trust state changes separately so as to discover the interplay between network overlay entities' trust evaluation and its underlie topological connectivity. Inspired from the trust studies in sociology, we propose that the Simmelian tie structured networks enable more positive impact on fostering trustworthiness among sensor nodes, while structural hole characterized networks provide more opportunity for misbehaviors and have negative impact to secure WSNs. These hypothesis have been confirmed by the extensive simulation studies.
History
Publication title
Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA ConferencePagination
96-103ISBN
9781467379519Department/School
School of Information and Communication TechnologyPublisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics EngineersPlace of publication
United StatesEvent title
2015 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA ConferenceEvent Venue
Helsinki, FinlandDate of Event (Start Date)
2015-08-20Date of Event (End Date)
2015-08-22Rights statement
Copyright 2015 IEEERepository Status
- Restricted