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Killing and Relevantly Similarly Letting Die


Davson-Galle, P, Killing and Relevantly Similarly Letting Die, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 15, (2) pp. 199-201. ISSN 0264-3758 (1998) [Refereed Article]

DOI: doi:10.1111/1468-5930.00087


© Society for Applied Philosophy, 1998, Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. Winston Nesbitt has argued [1] that the usual examples appealed to as supporting the view that killing is no worse than letting die are misleading in that the comparison cases are not set up properly to tap our intuitions. Making various adjustments to the cases he judges killing to be intuitively worse than letting die and suggests that such a result is meta-ethically appropriate to one view of the point of ethics. I contest each of these claims.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Research Division:Philosophy and Religious Studies
Research Group:Philosophy
Research Field:Social and political philosophy
Objective Division:Expanding Knowledge
Objective Group:Expanding knowledge
Objective Field:Expanding knowledge in psychology
UTAS Author:Davson-Galle, P (Mr Peter Davson-Galle)
ID Code:13558
Year Published:1998
Deposited By:Early Childhood and Primary Education
Deposited On:1998-08-01
Last Modified:2011-10-12

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