Non-compliance is a tenacious problem in recreational fisheries management, posing a risk to marine conservation and socio-ecological systems by, for example, undermining management efforts and creating conflict between resource user groups. In fisheries management, deterrence-based approaches have traditionally been used to tackle non-compliance. However, enforcement is often limited in recreational fisheries and an alternative approach is needed to improve compliance. In this paper, we explore the lessons from behavioural economics and apply nudge theory as the basis of alternative management approaches. Nudge theory argues that through positive reinforcement or indirect suggestion, voluntary compliance can be achieved. We test the influence of a nudge, based on a descriptive social norm, through an economic laboratory experiment in a recreational fisheries context. Our results show that the presence of this nudge can increase compliance behaviour by 10%. We find that a nudge was more effective when deterrence is low, but its effects become weaker when deterrence is already high. We also find heterogeneity across individual’s responses to the nudge and risk preferences significantly related to compliance behaviour. Nudges based on social norms have the potential to complement traditional deterrence methods and could prove successful as a cost-effective compliance tool in the marine environment.

Item Type:	Refereed Article
Keywords:	behavioural incentives, experimental economics, fisheries management, non-compliance, nudges, recreational fishing.
Research Division:	Economics
Research Group:	Applied economics
Research Field:	Environment and resource economics
Objective Division:	Environmental Management
Objective Group:	Coastal and estuarine systems and management
Objective Field:	Assessment and management of coastal and estuarine ecosystems
UTAS Author:	Mackay, M (Ms Mary Mackay)
UTAS Author:	Yamazaki, S (Associate Professor Satoshi Yamazaki)
UTAS Author:	Jennings, S (Dr Sarah Jennings)
UTAS Author:	Sibly, H (Dr Hugh Sibly)
UTAS Author:	Van Putten, IE (Dr Ingrid Van Putten)
UTAS Author:	Emery, TJ (Dr Timothy Emery)
ID Code:	130974
Year Published:	2020 (online first 2019)
Web of Science® Times Cited:	13
Deposited By:	Economics and Finance
Deposited On:	2019-02-25
Last Modified:	2022-08-24
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