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America’s exceptionalist tradition: from the law of nations to the international criminal court

Citation

Killingsworth, M, America's exceptionalist tradition: from the law of nations to the international criminal court, Global Society, 33, (2) pp. 285-304. ISSN 1360-0826 (2019) [Refereed Article]


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Copyright Statement

Copyright 2019 University of Kent. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in Global Society on 20/02/2019, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13600826.2019.1580678

DOI: doi:10.1080/13600826.2019.1580678

Abstract

How might we explain the reticence that the United States has towards the International Criminal Court, especially when one considers that the Rome Statute, the Court’s governing treaty, contains many of the legal protections afforded under the US legal system? This article will argue that the US’ relationship with the ICC is part of a longer pattern of US behaviour that can be best explained through the lens of exceptionalism. In making this argument, the article has two interrelated objectives: first, to provide an historical overview of how the US has behaved vis-à-vis treaty-based international legal institutions designed to moderate warfare; and second, to provide a critique of arguments that present the United States’ relationship with said legal institutions as nothing more than an expression of narrowly informed national interests.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Keywords:crime, USA, international criminology court
Research Division:Human Society
Research Group:Political science
Research Field:International relations
Objective Division:Law, Politics and Community Services
Objective Group:International relations
Objective Field:International relations not elsewhere classified
UTAS Author:Killingsworth, M (Dr Matt Killingsworth)
ID Code:130857
Year Published:2019
Deposited By:Office of the School of Social Sciences
Deposited On:2019-02-18
Last Modified:2020-09-10
Downloads:26 View Download Statistics

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