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Can partial project selection improve conservation auction performances?


Iftekhar, MS and Tisdell, JG and Sprod, D, Can partial project selection improve conservation auction performances?, Australasian Journal of Environmental Management, 25, (2) pp. 212-232. ISSN 1448-6563 (2018) [Refereed Article]

Copyright Statement

© 2018 Environment Institute of Australia and New Zealand Inc.

DOI: doi:10.1080/14486563.2017.1417164


Conservation auctions often follow an ‘all or nothing’ bid selection approach, which restricts the selection of the most suitable parts of a submitted project. The problem with ‘lumpy’ (or all-ornothing) project selection has been identified in the literature as a major problem in conservation policy; however, the extent of the problem has been rarely quantified. Using an actual conservation tender dataset from Tasmania, the effect of the approach was estimated. This study finds that with a relatively small budget, the cost-effectiveness loss could be as high as one-quarter. To avoid such problem, a partial bid selection could be applied. The basic principle of a partial bid selection is to invite a single project from each landholder with the option for the environmental planning agency to partially select sections of the offer lands that maximise the achievement of the agency’s policy objectives. A sensitivity analysis with different bid and ecological value correction factors shows that when the corrections are low, the partial selection approach could be more cost-effective than an ‘all or nothing’ approach. The results indicate that agencies should consider alternative project selection approaches with better targeting capabilities.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Keywords:land conservatuion, ecological economics, conservation payment, cost-effectiveness, lumpy bid selection, private land conservation, project selection
Research Division:Economics
Research Group:Other economics
Research Field:Ecological economics
Objective Division:Economic Framework
Objective Group:Microeconomics
Objective Field:Microeconomics not elsewhere classified
UTAS Author:Tisdell, JG (Professor John Tisdell)
UTAS Author:Sprod, D (Mr Daniel Sprod)
ID Code:124881
Year Published:2018
Deposited By:Economics and Finance
Deposited On:2018-03-16
Last Modified:2019-02-28

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