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Factivity, consistency and knowability

Citation

Chase, J and Rush, P, Factivity, consistency and knowability, Synthese, 195, (2) pp. 899-918. ISSN 0039-7857 (2018) [Refereed Article]

Copyright Statement

Copyright 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

DOI: doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1253-3

Abstract

One diagnosis of Fitch’s paradox of knowability is that it hinges on the factivity of knowledge: that which is known is true. Yet the apparent role of factivity (in the paradox of knowability) and non-factive analogues in related paradoxes of justified belief can be shown to depend on familiar consistency and positive introspection principles. Rejecting arguments that the paradox hangs on an implausible consistency principle, this paper argues instead that the Fitch phenomenon is generated both in epistemic logic and logics of justification by the interaction of analogues of the knowability principle and positive introspection theses that are characteristic of, even if not entailed by, epistemic internalism.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Keywords:knowledge, knowability, Fitch, epistemology, internalism
Research Division:Philosophy and Religious Studies
Research Group:Philosophy
Research Field:Epistemology
Objective Division:Expanding Knowledge
Objective Group:Expanding Knowledge
Objective Field:Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies
UTAS Author:Chase, J (Dr James Chase)
UTAS Author:Rush, P (Dr Penelope Rush)
ID Code:112486
Year Published:2018 (online first 2016)
Web of Science® Times Cited:4
Deposited By:Humanities
Deposited On:2016-11-14
Last Modified:2018-06-26
Downloads:0

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