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Bidding and performance unit combinatorial fishery quota auctions: Role of information feedbacks

Citation

Iftekhar, MD and Tisdell, JG, Bidding and performance unit combinatorial fishery quota auctions: Role of information feedbacks, Marine Policy, 62 pp. 233-243. ISSN 0308-597X (2015) [Refereed Article]

Copyright Statement

Copyright 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

DOI: doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2015.09.014

Abstract

This article explores the role of market information and learning in multiple unit combinatorial markets for fishing quota. Combinatorial auctions allow trading of packages of different types of quotas (for ex- ample for different regions or industry) in the same auction market. Bidders can submit package bids which would allow them to enjoy synergy benefits. However, to realize the full benefit bidders require comprehensive understanding of the market. This article focuses on the impact of varying levels of in- formation feedback on performance in multiple unit forward combinatorial auctions using laboratory experiments. In a general context of trade in fishery quota, it was asked whether (a) providing additional market information and (b) learning through time helps in more efficient outcomes. It is found that much of the benefits of information are derived from structural effects, like repeated rounds and package valuations. Providing additional market information does not improve auction performances to a large extent. These results will be useful in designing more efficient combinatorial markets for fisheries quota.

Item Details

Item Type:Refereed Article
Keywords:Fishery quota market
Research Division:Agricultural and Veterinary Sciences
Research Group:Fisheries Sciences
Research Field:Fisheries Management
Objective Division:Economic Framework
Objective Group:Microeconomics
Objective Field:Microeconomics not elsewhere classified
Author:Tisdell, JG (Professor John Tisdell)
ID Code:103491
Year Published:2015
Web of Science® Times Cited:1
Deposited By:Tasmanian School of Business and Economics
Deposited On:2015-10-13
Last Modified:2017-11-27
Downloads:0

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